Cross-posted at Naeem’s Blog.
I’ve been reading through many of the news reports as well as the Islamosphere to get a better understanding of what really happened in Islamabad.
I’ve said before that its morally reprehensible and intellectually dishonest for us to make judgments on those labeled as Islamists (as well as any other contentious issue) based solely on one side of the story. Granted its not always easy to tell fact from fiction or truth from propaganda but we must at least hold on formulating an opinion until we hear all sides of the story. Here are some of the lightly reported aspects of the story that I’ve been able to glean from various reports:
1. Very few people actually heard Maulana Abdur-Rasheed Ghazi’s message. Here is a comprehensive speech (sorry but its in Urdu) summarizing all of what he was calling for. His demands made in this speech several months ago could not be considered overly extreme or foreign to the common Pakistani (end corruption and cronyism, cease immoral activities, implement Sharia laws in the court systems, etc.).
2. As tempered as his original message may have been, it was lost during the crisis this past week. As one brother living in Islamabad pointed out to me, it was very odd that Ghazi failed to mention his populist message during the stand-off. It would have seemed an opportune time to do so, with all of the world’s eyes on him.
3. He was constantly in touch with the media via his cell phone and he made it clear that he was not holding any women or children as hostages for the purpose of using them as human shields. According to him, that was part of the government’s smear campaign against him. (Link)
4. He made several capitulating gestures to the government where he was ready to unconditionally surrender and have any cases against him heard in the courts. His proposal also included handing over control of the Lal Masjid/Jamia Hafsa facilities to a third party. However, his stance changed when Ghazi was quoted on Geo TV as saying his mother had been wounded by gunfire. “The government is using full force. This is naked aggression. My martyrdom is certain now.” Later he was quoted as saying, “We will not surrender. We will be martyred, but we will not surrender.”
5. The day before the storming of the compound, a negotiating team consisting of Pakistani Ulema and former politicians, some of whom are known to be staunch government supporters, met with Ghazi for almost 12 hours in an attempt to end the stand-off peacefully. In fact, the two sides came to an amicable agreement summarized in a draft resolution. However, the Ulema group claimed that the government sabotaged the negotiations and “accused the government of creating a deadlock on the issue at the last moment and foiling all efforts to resolve it in a peaceful way.” (Link)
6. Another negotiator, Maulana Shah Abdul Aziz, assigned by the government to hold talks between the military and Ghazi claimed in an interview with Asia Times Online that the arrest of Ghazi’s brother dressed in a burqa was a ploy by the government. Also, referring to an interview with his burqa-clad brother by state-owned PTV, Ghazi explained “He is a prisoner of war. The government had no right to humiliate him by presenting (him) in such way on TV.”
7. The existence of foreign militants was another element that was barely mentioned in the news coverage. Although Ghazi flat-out rejected their presence (In the final negotiations before the storming of the compound, one of his conditions was for the media to visit the complex to prove his point there were no major weapons, nor foreigners present with him as claimed by the government. But his proposal was shot down), the military claimed to the contrary, even going so far as to blame the failed talks on Ghazi’s insistence on the foreign militants getting a free passage. That claim by the government was later debunked by the negotiating team “He always asked for guarantees for him as well as for those who were with him inside, but he never mentioned ‘foreign militants’,” said Maulana Hanif Jalandari. Regardless, it would be interesting to know how much of a factor the presence of foreign militants had in the tough stance taken by the military (and let’s not discount the added pressure from the US in cracking down on these foreign fighters).
8. And lets not forget the political tensions boiling over in the Chief Justice scandal where Musharraf unceremoniously sacked the top judge of the Pakistani court system. To what extent the extreme pressure that Musharraf was feeling from all quarters had a role in his decision to let off some steam on the militants will never be known. But it is worth considering.
I have purposefully avoided repeating the missteps and blunders carried out by Ghazi and Co. The CNN’s and BBC’s have done an adequate job in regurgitating that part of the story. My intent with this post was to present the other side and allow you to make your own judgment about the Lal Masjid tragedy.
Finally, I came across several thoughtful posts that looked at the bigger picture and provide some interesting insight. Umar Lee concluded from this event that a central Islamic authority would have been very useful in keeping such reactionary movements in check. Ali Eteraz posted on the corrupt nature of religious leadership and our need to be more critical of who we regard as our leaders (I must note that I don’t agree with his other contentions, but that’s for another day). Muslimmatters also provided a good post with some very insightful comments (Sh. Yasir Qadhi gave his thoughts also) on the root causes and the overarching consequences of these types of dilemmas.
